Threats

Blood bank fridges hit in Europe's refrigeration cyberattacks

Refrigeration controllers at French blood service sites and stores in eight European countries were tampered with this week. Alarms prevented losses at the blood service. Here is what OT and facility teams should do.

OTVista article cover: Blood bank fridges hit in Europe's refrigeration cyberattacks

Attackers who tampered with connected refrigeration systems across Europe this week also reached the cold storage monitoring and control systems of several regional sites of France's blood service, the Etablissement français du sang (EFS). Alarms alerted staff, blood was moved to unconnected fridges and the French health ministry says no products were lost. Anyone running remotely managed refrigeration, building or process controllers should take them off the public internet now, check every remote access path and confirm that alarms reach a person who can act.

This is the second wave of a campaign that OTVista covered at the end of October, when supermarket refrigeration controllers in France were manipulated. The new element is the target: cold chain systems that protect medical supplies, not just food.

What happened

According to Reuters, as published by ABC News, the attack on the blood service took place overnight from Sunday 1 November into Monday 2 November 2026. The French health ministry said it affected certain cold storage room monitoring and control systems at several regional EFS facilities. An EFS spokesperson said staff were warned by alerts and moved blood to refrigerators that were not connected. The ministry said remote access to the affected refrigerators had been disabled, and that France's national cybersecurity agency and the health ministry are investigating how the attack was carried out and when systems can safely return to service.

The National reports, citing French media, that controllers were reprogrammed to drive temperatures far above the normal level of around minus 30 °C, and that the increase was spotted in time. It also reports that the health ministry said there were no operational consequences because of early detection. These figures come from local media and have not been confirmed in an official technical statement.

At the same time, refrigeration in shops was tampered with in eight European countries, according to Reuters. The National reports that Coop in Sweden had seven stores affected, which are back in operation but disconnected from the internet, that an Edeka store in Germany was hit, and that the UK's NCSC said attempts against small meat processing firms had minimal impact. CBS News describes this as the second such wave in less than a month, after hundreds of French stores were targeted in October.

The National reports that systems from the refrigeration controls vendor Danfoss were again among those targeted, and that Danfoss recommends its systems should not be directly reachable from the internet. No source we read has stated how the attackers got in, and no group has been confirmed as responsible.

Why it matters for OT

Refrigeration controllers are OT. They run a physical process, they often sit on building or facility networks with little segmentation, and they are frequently managed remotely by an installer or maintenance contractor through a web interface, a cloud portal or a router with port forwarding. Many are installed once and then forgotten by IT and security teams.

The consequences of manipulation are physical and fast. In food retail it means discarded stock and lost revenue. In a blood service it could mean losing donations and samples that cannot be replaced quickly, with knock-on effects for hospitals. The same pattern applies to vaccine stores, pharmaceutical warehouses, laboratories and process cooling in manufacturing.

This week's events also show what worked. Independent alarms and a staff response plan meant the blood service caught the change and moved product before it was lost. Detection and a practised manual fallback are what turned a potentially serious incident into a contained one.

Who should act

  • Healthcare: blood services, hospital pharmacies, laboratories and biobanks
  • Food retail, cold storage, logistics and food processing
  • Pharmaceutical manufacturing and distribution
  • Any site where building management or HVAC controllers are reachable remotely

In the EU, many of these organisations fall under NIS2 as essential or important entities, including healthcare, food production and distribution, and manufacturing of medical products. NIS2 expects risk management that covers supply chain and remote access, and timely incident reporting. See our overview of EU requirements.

What to do now

  1. Find every remotely reachable controller. List refrigeration, HVAC and building management controllers, their web interfaces and cloud portals. Check your external address range for exposed interfaces, and ask installers and maintenance contractors which remote connections they use.
  2. Remove direct internet exposure. No controller interface should be reachable from the public internet. Where remote support is needed, route it through a controlled, authenticated and logged access path that is switched on only when needed. See remote access control.
  3. Change default and shared credentials. Replace factory and shared passwords on controllers, gateways and vendor portals, enable multi-factor authentication where the platform supports it, and remove accounts that are no longer needed.
  4. Separate the network. Put controllers in their own zone, and allow only the specific management connections they need. Block internet egress from that zone.
  5. Make alarms independent and tested. Make sure temperature alarms do not rely only on the same controller that could be manipulated. Use an independent sensor or logger where the stakes are high, and confirm alerts reach someone on duty at night and at weekends.
  6. Rehearse the manual fallback. Know where product can be moved, who decides, and how to run equipment locally without remote management.
  7. Watch for configuration changes. Review setpoint and configuration change logs, ask vendors about recent advisories, and report incidents to your national CSIRT as required.

How OTVista helps

If you want support, OTVista researchers can help. Related services: OT cybersecurity assessment. The free OT Security Quick Check is a quick way to see where to start.

Sources: ABC News (Reuters), French blood banks hit alongside cyberattack on European supermarkets; The National, Blood banks among victims of European cyber attacks; CBS News, Hackers have hijacked grocery store freezers and accessed France's blood banks

Topics: blood bank cyberattack France, refrigeration controller cyberattack Europe, EFS cyberattack, cold chain OT security, supermarket fridge hack, building management system security

Frequently asked questions

What happened to France's blood banks?

According to the French health ministry, as reported by Reuters, attackers affected cold storage monitoring and control systems at several regional sites of the Etablissement français du sang overnight on 1 to 2 November 2026. Alerts warned staff, who moved blood to unconnected fridges, and no products were lost.

Is this linked to the supermarket fridge attacks?

It happened at the same time as tampering with refrigeration at stores in eight European countries, including Coop stores in Sweden and an Edeka store in Germany. Media describe it as the second wave after hundreds of French supermarkets were hit in October.

Who is behind the refrigeration attacks?

No source we reviewed has confirmed who is responsible. France's national cybersecurity agency and the health ministry are investigating.

How can organisations protect refrigeration and building controllers?

Remove direct internet exposure, change default and shared passwords, route vendor access through a controlled and logged path, segment controllers in their own network zone, and make sure temperature alarms are independent and reach someone who can act.

Does NIS2 apply to these systems?

Many affected sectors, such as healthcare and food production and distribution, are in scope of NIS2. In-scope organisations are expected to manage cyber risk across their systems and suppliers, including remote access, and to report significant incidents.

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