The SCKit campaign is an active attack, reported from 11 November 2026, in which an unknown threat actor abused ConnectWise ScreenConnect, a remote support tool widely used by managed service providers (MSPs), to plant rogue remote-access clients on customer machines. No industrial victims have been confirmed, but OT teams should treat it as a warning: if a vendor, integrator or MSP can reach your plant through a remote support tool, an attacker who takes over that tool can too. Check now which remote access tools touch your OT environment, who controls them, and whether you could cut them off quickly.
What happened
On 11 November 2026, ConnectWise reported malicious activity affecting partners that run ScreenConnect. Microsoft Threat Intelligence confirmed the activity and published a detailed analysis on 13 November, naming the toolkit "SCKit". Security firm Huntress also flagged the campaign publicly on the day it started, according to trade press reports.
At a high level, the attackers did the following:
- Used the remote support channel itself. Through ScreenConnect's legitimate remote command features, they silently installed a second, rogue ScreenConnect client on managed customer endpoints. That client connected to infrastructure the attackers controlled, giving them their own persistent remote access.
- Hid and persisted. Microsoft describes staged scripts, scheduled tasks and startup entries for persistence, plus added antivirus exclusions to avoid detection.
- Went after technicians. The toolkit searched browsers for ScreenConnect session cookies, which could let an attacker act as a logged-in technician. Microsoft also describes a worm-like design intended to reach technicians who connect to an infected machine and then spread to other managed devices. Microsoft presents this as how the toolkit is designed, not as a confirmed chain of infections, and several researchers report they did not see the technician-side step succeed.
The likely entry route, according to Microsoft (citing ConnectWise) and Huntress, was a set of third-party ScreenConnect extensions, in particular older versions of an "RMM+" extension that could accept a blank access key when none had been configured. ConnectWise has said it found no compromise of its own infrastructure, and the root cause is still being investigated. ConnectWise disabled the affected extensions on cloud-hosted instances; on-premises customers have to disable them themselves.
A separate client-side flaw, CVE-2026-84869, is part of the story. Microsoft says ScreenConnect client version 26.6.5 and later, released in September 2026, blocks the file-transfer path the toolkit uses to reach technicians. Technician clients do not update automatically when the cloud console does, so they must be checked separately.
How big is it? Early reporting, citing Huntress telemetry, put the confirmed impact at about 288 endpoints across 48 organizations. ConnectWise reportedly found roughly 400 partner environments with at least one of the affected extensions installed, which is a measure of exposure, not of confirmed compromise. No threat actor has been named, and no OT or industrial victims have been publicly confirmed. We will update this post if that changes.
Why it matters for OT
Remote support tools are one of the most common ways into industrial networks, and they are often outside the OT team's direct control. Machine builders, system integrators, building management contractors and IT service providers routinely use tools such as ScreenConnect to support HMIs, historians, engineering workstations and site servers. In smaller plants, the MSP that runs the office IT may also look after the PCs on the plant floor.
SCKit shows three uncomfortable things for OT owners:
- The trusted channel became the attack channel. No firewall rule is broken when a remote tool you already allow is used against you. Traffic looks like normal support activity.
- The weak link can be an add-on. The reported entry route was a third-party extension, not the core product. Few OT asset registers record which plug-ins a supplier's remote tool has enabled.
- One provider, many sites. An MSP compromise reaches every customer at once. If several of your sites, or your OT and IT, share one provider, a single incident can touch all of them.
For OT, the consequence of rogue remote access is not only data theft. An attacker sitting on an engineering workstation or an HMI host may be able to view processes, change configurations or disrupt operations. That is why remote access deserves the same attention as any other path into a control system.
Who should act
- Asset owners in energy, water, manufacturing, process, transport and buildings whose OT systems are supported remotely by vendors, integrators or MSPs.
- OT and site engineering teams who have remote support agents installed on HMIs, SCADA servers, historians or engineering workstations, even if those agents were installed "temporarily" years ago.
- MSPs, integrators and machine builders that run ScreenConnect, especially on-premises instances with third-party extensions.
- Security and procurement teams who own supplier access agreements.
What to do now
- Ask your providers directly. Contact every vendor, integrator and MSP with remote access to your OT systems. Ask whether they use ScreenConnect, whether any of the named extensions were enabled, whether they have checked for rogue clients, and when they will confirm in writing.
- Find every remote access agent on OT hosts. Look for ScreenConnect and other remote support clients on HMIs, servers and engineering workstations. Pay special attention to a second or unexpected ScreenConnect client, new scheduled tasks and unexplained antivirus exclusions.
- Investigate out of band. If you suspect a host, do not use the same remote tool to look at it. Huntress and Microsoft both warn against this. Use local access or a separate, trusted method, and preserve evidence before cleaning up.
- Disable or isolate where you can. If a provider cannot confirm it is clean, temporarily block that remote tool at the OT boundary and move to supervised, on-request access. Agree this with operations first so that support for critical systems is not lost.
- Update technician clients and remove risky extensions. Providers should run ScreenConnect client 26.6.5 or later on technician machines and keep the affected extensions disabled, following ConnectWise and Microsoft guidance.
- Reset sessions and credentials. Ask providers to revoke active sessions and rotate any credentials that may have been exposed, including accounts used to reach your systems.
- Route vendor access through one controlled path. Longer term, remote access to OT should pass through a monitored access point in a DMZ, with multi-factor authentication, approval per session, time limits and logging, rather than agents installed directly on control system hosts.
- Write it into contracts. Supplier agreements should require prompt incident notification, an inventory of remote tools and add-ons used, and your right to approve or revoke access.
How OTVista can help
OTVista is an independent OT security research project, and we share what we learn so that teams can act on it. If this incident has raised questions about third-party access to your plants, our OT security architecture review looks at remote access paths, DMZ design and vendor connectivity. Knowing what is installed is the starting point, so our guide to building a cybersecurity asset inventory explains how to record software agents and who owns them. For tracking flaws such as CVE-2026-84869 across OT hosts, see our approach to OT vulnerability management.
If you want a quick starting point, try our free OT security self-check. It runs in your browser and takes about ten minutes, and it includes questions on remote and third-party access.
Sources
- Microsoft Security Blog: SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions (13 Nov 2026)
- BleepingComputer: New worm-like SCKit malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks
- The Back Room Tech: Active ScreenConnect campaign compromises MSP environments and customer devices (14 Nov 2026)
Cover photo: ThisisEngineering on Unsplash, used under the Unsplash License.
Topics: SCKit, ScreenConnect attack, CVE-2026-84869, OT remote access security, MSP supply chain attack
