Regulation

NCSC warns of AI ransomware on UK critical infrastructure by 2028

The NCSC's Annual Review 2026 judges that AI-powered malware will highly likely be used in a ransomware attack on UK critical national infrastructure by 2028. Here is what it means for OT operators and the steps to take now.

OTVista article cover: NCSC warns of AI ransomware on UK critical infrastructure by 2028

The UK's National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) says it is highly likely that AI-powered malware will be used in a ransomware attack on UK critical national infrastructure (CNI) by 2028. For OT operators, the message is to act now on known weaknesses: retire end-of-life systems, reduce exposure of control systems, tighten access and shorten the time it takes to remediate vulnerabilities.

What happened

On 3 November 2026 the NCSC published its Annual Review 2026, covering 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2026. NCSC chief executive Richard Horne launched it with a speech in London the same day.

According to the review's chapter on the cyber threat to the UK, the NCSC judges it highly likely that, between now and 2028, AI-powered malware will have been used in a ransomware attack on UK CNI. The review describes AI as a force multiplier: it is unlikely to change what hostile actors want, but it is highly likely to increase their speed, scale and efficiency. The NCSC also expects AI-assisted vulnerability discovery to create a race to shorten patch deployment timelines.

The review's incident management chapter gives these figures for the year:

  • 1,831 reports of cyber attacks received by the NCSC Incident Management team
  • 337 incidents that needed the team's support after triage
  • 80 of those classed as nationally significant
  • 8,500 organisations notified through the Early Warning service about events indicating suspected compromise

The NCSC notes that most successful compromises still rely on familiar methods: known vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, stolen credentials and social engineering. It says several incidents linked to state or state-aligned actors exploited vulnerabilities for which patches existed but had not been applied quickly enough. It also reports potentially increasing exploitation of internet-facing systems within CNI environments.

On state threats, the review describes China as the most sophisticated and sustained cyber challenge to the UK, and Russia as the most audacious. It records that the UK and EU attributed a December 2025 attack on Poland's energy grid to Russia's FSB Centre 16, and states that, had it succeeded, the attack could have cut electricity to 500,000 people.

In his speech, Horne turned directly to the technology that automates physical processes. He listed electricity switching, water sluice gates, dam operations, manufacturing lines, and heating and refrigeration controls, and said these systems are "not built on the strong foundations they require". He described their exposure as large and increasingly exploited, pointing to the recent disruption of refrigeration systems across Europe. He also said: "For decades we have collectively got away with tech on the cheap." Technology publication The Next Web reported the same core findings on 4 November.

Why it matters for OT

This is a clear signal from a national authority that the controls running physical processes are now a mainstream target, not a niche concern. Three points stand out for industrial operators.

First, the entry points are ordinary. The NCSC's own incident data shows that known, unpatched vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems and stolen credentials remain the main routes in. In OT this typically means exposed HMIs and controllers, remote access gateways, VPN appliances and vendor connections that bridge into flat networks.

Second, AI compresses the timeline. If attackers can find and weaponise flaws faster, the long patch cycles common in OT, where a change may wait for a planned outage, leave a wider window of exposure. Where patching is constrained, compensating controls have to carry more of the load.

Third, ransomware does not need to reach a controller to stop production. Encrypting historians, engineering workstations, manufacturing execution systems or the IT services that operations depend on can force a shutdown on safety or business grounds. The review cites Jaguar Land Rover reporting about £196 million in direct cyber-related costs from its 2025 incident.

Horne's point about "tech on the cheap" also lands hard in OT, where legacy and end-of-life systems are often kept in service for decades because they still work.

Who should act

The warning is addressed to UK critical national infrastructure: energy, water, transport, manufacturing supply chains and other essential services. UK operators should note that the NCSC now recommends the Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Core Profile as a minimum resilience benchmark for essential services, and that the Cyber Security and Resilience Bill is intended, in Horne's words, to "establish a minimum level of resilience" across CNI.

The underlying risks are not specific to the UK. The same internet-facing exposure, legacy estates and slow remediation affect operators under NIS2 in the EU, sector rules in the US and national OT controls in the Middle East. Any organisation running industrial control systems can use the NCSC findings as a benchmark for its own priorities.

What to do now

  1. Find and remove internet exposure. Check for HMIs, PLCs, gateways and remote access services reachable from the internet, and take them off it or place them behind authenticated, monitored access. Keep an up-to-date OT asset inventory so you know what to look for.
  2. Lock down remote and vendor access. Require multi-factor authentication, time-limited sessions and named accounts, and route access through a controlled intermediate zone. Grant access where it is necessary, not where it is convenient.
  3. Segment IT from OT. Make sure ransomware on the business network cannot spread into control networks. Review firewall rules and conduits against an agreed zones and conduits model.
  4. Shorten remediation for what matters most. Prioritise known exploited vulnerabilities on internet-facing and boundary systems. Where you cannot patch, apply compensating controls such as restricting services, tightening rules and adding monitoring.
  5. Plan the retirement of end-of-life systems. List unsupported operating systems and devices, rate them by consequence, and build a funded replacement or isolation plan.
  6. Prepare to operate through ransomware. Keep tested, offline backups of controller logic, configurations and engineering projects, and rehearse manual or degraded operation with operations staff.
  7. Benchmark against a recognised framework. UK operators can use the CAF Core Profile. Others can use IEC 62443 or their national requirements, with gaps recorded and owned.

How OTVista helps

If you want support, OTVista researchers can help. Related services: OT cybersecurity assessment. The free OT Security Quick Check is a quick way to see where to start.

Sources: NCSC, Annual Review 2026; NCSC, Annual Review 2026: The cyber threat to the UK; NCSC, Annual Review 2026: Incident management; NCSC, Annual Review 2026: A moment of choice; NCSC, Richard Horne's speech at the NCSC Annual Review 2026 launch; The Next Web, UK cyber agency warns of AI-powered ransomware on infrastructure by 2028

Topics: NCSC Annual Review 2026, AI ransomware critical infrastructure, UK CNI cyber threat, OT ransomware protection, CAF Core Profile, OT remote access security

Frequently asked questions

What did the NCSC Annual Review 2026 warn about?

The NCSC judges it highly likely that AI-powered malware will be used in a ransomware attack on UK critical national infrastructure by 2028. It describes AI as a force multiplier that increases attackers' speed, scale and efficiency.

How many nationally significant incidents did the NCSC handle?

For 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2026, the NCSC received 1,831 reports, supported 337 incidents and classed 80 of those as nationally significant.

How do most attackers get in, according to the NCSC?

Most successful compromises still use known vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems, stolen credentials and social engineering. Several state-linked incidents exploited vulnerabilities whose patches had not been applied in time.

What should OT operators do first?

Remove internet exposure of control systems, secure remote and vendor access, segment IT from OT, and prioritise remediation of known exploited vulnerabilities, using compensating controls where patching is constrained.

What benchmark does the NCSC recommend for essential services?

The NCSC recommends the Cyber Assessment Framework (CAF) Core Profile as a minimum resilience benchmark for essential services and other critical organisations.

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