Eight eMudhra intermediate CA private keys were compromised in October 2026, which means Java applications that still trust the affected eMudhra (emSign) roots can be tricked into accepting a forged TLS certificate. OT teams should find every Java-based OPC UA, MQTT and engineering tool in their plants, apply the vendor updates (Prosys released fixed OPC UA tools on 4 November), and remove the affected roots from bundled trust stores without ever switching off certificate validation.
Most coverage of this incident has focused on browsers and cloud services. The less visible exposure is in industrial software that ships its own Java runtime and its own certificate store, and that is rarely updated on the same cycle as the operating system around it.
What happened
According to IBM's security bulletin, the private keys for eight eMudhra intermediate CA certificates were compromised. Brandefense's incident timeline, citing eMudhra and public reporting, says the keys were weak enough to recover and that eMudhra revoked all eight intermediates on 18 October 2026, with browser and operating system vendors adding blocks and removals over the following days.
Two CVEs cover the Java side of the problem:
- CVE-2026-91403: Oracle published a Security Alert on 21 October 2026 describing a JSSE vulnerability with a CVSS score of 9.1, fixed by an update that distrusts the impacted intermediate CAs. Red Hat later described this first fix as insufficient and easy to bypass.
- CVE-2026-114820: the follow-up change, tied by IBM and Prosys to the OpenJDK advisory of 24 October 2026, which removes the affected root CAs.
Red Hat rates CVE-2026-91403 lower for its own products (CVSS 6.8) because an attack needs specific conditions, which is a useful reminder that severity depends on how a product is deployed.
The OT-specific angle comes from Prosys OPC, an OPC UA tool vendor. Its advisory, first published on 26 October and updated on 4 November, explains that the Java runtime bundled with its products trusted four emSign roots (G1, G3, C1 and C3). On 4 November Prosys released OPC UA Simulation Server 2026.2.2, OPC UA Browser 2026.2.2 and OPC UA Monitor 1.7.8 with updated runtimes. A fixed release of Prosys Forge had not been named at the time of writing, and Prosys has published manual mitigations in the meantime. IBM added fixed Semeru Runtimes for Java 8 and 11 on 5 November.
Prosys stated that no exploitation in the wild was known as of 26 October. Brandefense reports that Cisco Talos saw no malicious use as of 21 October.
Why it matters for OT
A compromised CA key lets its holder sign a certificate for any host name. That alone does not break into a plant. According to Prosys, an attacker also needs a position to intercept traffic between the client and the real server, for example on the local network, through a compromised router or by manipulating DNS.
That is exactly why this matters for OT. Many industrial networks are still flat, share DNS with the office network, or carry plant data to cloud brokers and historians across several hops. In that setting, an attacker who already has a foothold can use a trusted forged certificate to sit silently in the middle of a connection that operators believe is protected by TLS.
Prosys describes what this could mean for its Forge integration product: reading and changing outbound MQTT and HTTP data, capturing MQTT, HTTP, OAuth2 and LDAP or Active Directory credentials, and injecting false values into mapped OPC UA nodes. Prosys notes that this does not give remote code execution and does not decrypt traffic recorded earlier. False process values or stolen service credentials are still a serious integrity problem for any operator who relies on that data.
The wider lesson is about where trust stores live. Industrial applications frequently bundle their own Java runtime. Patching Windows or the Linux CA package does not update a certificate store sitting inside an application folder, a container image or an embedded gateway.
Who should act
- Operators in any sector (energy, water, manufacturing, oil and gas, transport) that use Java-based OPC UA clients, servers, gateways, MQTT bridges or historian connectors.
- Teams running Prosys OPC UA tools or Forge, IBM Semeru or Oracle Java SE in OT or IT/OT integration zones.
- System integrators and OEMs who ship industrial software with an embedded JRE, because their customers depend on them to update it.
For organisations working towards NIS2 or IEC 62443, this is also a practical test of how quickly supplier fixes reach your plant.
What to do now
- Find the Java runtimes. Search engineering workstations, OPC UA servers, gateways, historians and integration servers for bundled JREs and their
cacertsfiles. Record the product, version and runtime in your OT asset inventory so the next CA incident is a lookup, not a hunt. - Apply vendor updates. Install Prosys Simulation Server 2026.2.2, Browser 2026.2.2 and Monitor 1.7.8 where used, and the fixed Oracle Java SE or IBM Semeru releases listed in their advisories. Ask other OT software suppliers whether their bundled runtime trusts the affected emSign roots and when they will ship a fix.
- Remove the roots where no fix exists yet. Follow the vendor's instructions to remove the affected emSign roots from bundled trust stores, take a backup first, test in a maintenance window, and repeat after each product update until a fixed release arrives. Prosys documents this for Forge.
- Never disable validation as a workaround. Prosys explicitly advises keeping certificate validation and hostname verification switched on. Where possible, pin each connection to the specific CA it needs rather than trusting a whole bundle.
- Be careful with revocation checking. IBM suggests enabling revocation checking in Java, but Prosys warns that online revocation checks can break every TLS connection in plant networks where revocation servers are unreachable. Test before enabling it in production.
- Reduce interception paths. Separate OT DNS from corporate DNS, restrict which hosts OPC UA and MQTT clients can reach, and review the conduits that carry plant data to brokers and cloud services. An OT security architecture review is the natural place to check this.
- Track it like any other OT vulnerability. Log affected assets, owners, fixes and compensating controls in your OT vulnerability management process, and close each item with evidence.
How OTVista helps
If you want support, OTVista researchers can help. Related services: OT vulnerability management, OT asset inventory and OT security architecture review. The free OT Security Quick Check is a quick way to see where to start.
Sources: Prosys OPC, Security Advisory: eMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise (CVE-2026-91403, CVE-2026-114820); Prosys OPC, Simulation Server 2026.2.2, Browser 2026.2.2 and Monitor 1.7.8 released; Oracle, Security Alert CVE-2026-91403; IBM, Security Bulletin: eMudhra CA Certificate Compromise; Red Hat, CVE-2026-91403; Brandefense, eMudhra CA Key Compromise: Timeline, Impact; Viakoo via Security Boulevard, Daily OT Security News: November 09, 2026
Cover photo: Kevin Ache on Unsplash, used under the Unsplash License.
Topics: eMudhra CA compromise, CVE-2026-91403, CVE-2026-114820, OPC UA certificate security, Java trust store OT, OT vulnerability management
