CISA has launched an Installed Base Program in which it works with OT equipment manufacturers to find vulnerable, internet-exposed industrial devices and notify the organisations that run them, using administrative subpoenas to identify owners where public data only points to an internet provider. OT operators should not wait for that notice: find and remove their own internet-exposed controllers now, put any remote access that must remain behind a controlled gateway, and know how to verify a genuine CISA contact.
What happened
On 10 November 2026, Industrial Cyber reported that the US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) had announced the Installed Base Program, and CISA has published a programme page describing it. In CISA's words, the "installed base" means the products that manufacturers build and their customers deploy and operate.
The programme targets a practical gap. When researchers or scanners find a vulnerable OT device on the internet, public data usually shows only the internet service provider behind the IP address, not the organisation that owns the device. According to CISA, the programme closes that gap in five stages:
- Data gathering and asset discovery. Participating original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) review vulnerable IP data, from their own sources, third parties or CISA, validate it and prioritise which exposed equipment CISA should analyse.
- CISA analysis. CISA uses open source and internal tools, including its Cyber Hygiene Vulnerability Scanning Service, to confirm the device, its exposure and its owner.
- Administrative subpoena. Where ownership is still unclear, CISA can use its administrative subpoena authority to obtain owner or operator contact details from the service provider, typically the ISP.
- Notification. CISA Regional Cybersecurity Advisors contact the organisation with a CISA mitigation guide that summarises the vulnerability and recommends steps, including removing the device from internet exposure.
- Feedback. CISA shares aggregated results on sectors, notification status and exposure with the OEMs and with Sector Risk Management Agencies.
CISA says these notifications have already led critical infrastructure organisations to take thousands of vulnerable assets off the internet, and that participating OEMs have seen significant reductions in exposed assets across their customers. Participation is voluntary for manufacturers, partners typically meet CISA monthly, and OEM-specific data is handled under TLP:AMBER+STRICT. CISA has not published a list of participating manufacturers on the programme page.
Why it matters for OT
The announcement comes days after a clear demonstration of what internet exposure costs. On 6 November, CISA, the FBI and other US agencies urged organisations to harden refrigeration and cold chain controllers after attacks on supermarkets and a blood bank in Europe, a campaign we have covered on this blog. SecurityWeek, citing Censys, reported that 6,695 internet-exposed refrigeration controllers were visible on 9 October and 3,124 were still reachable on 5 November. Exposure falls when owners are told, but slowly, and the devices that remain are the easiest targets.
CISA's own explanation of why the programme matters is familiar to anyone who works in OT: many legacy devices and protocols were never designed for internet connectivity, often lack authentication and encryption, and were connected for convenience, frequently for remote access. A controller reachable from the internet removes every layer of defence between an attacker and the process.
There are three operational points worth drawing out:
- A notice means someone else saw your device first. If CISA or a manufacturer can find it with scanning tools, so can criminal and hacktivist groups.
- Ownership gaps are not only a public-data problem. Many operators cannot quickly say which of their own IP addresses belong to OT devices, who manages them, or why they were exposed. Integrators, OEM service contracts, cellular routers and "temporary" vendor access are common sources of forgotten exposure.
- Notifications can be impersonated. CISA advises recipients to verify any contact through CISA Central before acting. A verification step belongs in your process before anyone acts on an unexpected security notice.
Who should act
The programme itself is US focused: notifications typically go to US organisations across the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, including state, local, tribal and territorial governments. That includes water and wastewater utilities, energy, manufacturing, food and agriculture, healthcare and transport operators, many of which run small OT estates with limited security staff.
The underlying lesson applies everywhere. Operators in the EU under NIS2, in the UK under the NIS Regulations and the Cyber Assessment Framework, and in Gulf states working to national OT controls all face the same expectation: know your assets and do not expose control systems directly to the internet. Our overview of OT cybersecurity standards summarises how these frameworks treat asset management and network boundaries.
Manufacturers and system integrators should also take note. CISA is asking OEMs to share product details, known vulnerabilities and common misconfigurations, so customers may increasingly hear about exposure from their suppliers as well as from government.
What to do now
- Search for your own exposure first. Check your public IP ranges, including those at remote sites, against internet scanning services and your ISP records. Look for OT web interfaces, industrial protocols and remote management ports. Do not run active scans against live control networks without engineering approval; passive and external checks are the safe starting point.
- Tie every exposed address to an owner. Record which device, site, system owner and vendor each address belongs to, and why it is reachable. This is the same information that a sound OT asset inventory should already hold, and gaps here usually explain why exposure persisted.
- Remove direct exposure, then rebuild access properly. Take controllers and HMIs off the internet. Where remote access is genuinely needed, route it through a managed gateway or jump host in an industrial DMZ, with phishing-resistant MFA, named accounts and session logging. An OT security architecture review can confirm that no other paths bypass that gateway.
- Prioritise by consequence, not by count. Deal first with exposed devices that can change a physical process, such as controllers, safety-related systems and building or refrigeration controllers, before read-only monitoring interfaces.
- Apply fixes or compensating controls. Check vendor advisories for the exposed products. Where patching needs an outage, restrict access by source address, disable unused services and change default credentials in the meantime. Our guidance on OT vulnerability management covers patch triage when maintenance windows are limited.
- Prepare for a notification. Decide who receives and handles an external exposure notice, record how to verify CISA contacts through CISA Central, and agree in advance who can authorise taking a device offline.
- Monitor for change. Re-check external exposure on a schedule and after any site change, vendor visit or new cellular connection, because exposure tends to return quietly.
How OTVista helps
OTVista researchers publish practical guidance on finding and reducing OT exposure, and we support organisations with asset inventory development, architecture reviews and vulnerability triage that account for operational constraints. Our free OT security self-check is a quick way to see where remote access, asset knowledge and network boundaries need attention first.
Sources: CISA, Installed Base Program; Industrial Cyber, CISA's Installed Base Program to help OEMs identify and secure internet-exposed OT assets across critical infrastructure; SecurityWeek, US Agencies Urge Organizations to Harden Refrigeration Controllers
Cover photo: Albert Stoynov on Unsplash, used under the Unsplash License.
Topics: CISA Installed Base Program, internet-exposed OT devices, OT exposure reduction, OT asset inventory, OT remote access security, OT vulnerability management
